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Abstract 
Kerala has one of the most stable party systems in India, and represents a clear exception to 
the Indian norm of volatility, instability, and electoral change. In this article we explore the 
geographical structure of this stability, and examine the extent to which current political 
divisions are a reflection of the divisions that existed at the inception of mass democracy in 
Kerala more than 50 years ago. First, we examine the extent to which historical legacies of 
party formation shape contemporary patterns of voting behaviour. Second, we examine the 
extent to which these historical legacies were established along social lines to do with caste, 
religion and class. Finally we discuss the implications of these results. 
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Introduction 
India is frequently characterised as politically unstable: elections are volatile, anti-
incumbency is high, and parties are dominated by charismatic leaders who garner votes by 
patronage and clientelism rather than pursuing programmatic policies. Against this back-drop 
Kerala represents a sharp contrast to the pattern of party politics seen in many states around 
India. Kerala has a long history of party stability. Programmatic parties have emerged with 
clear policy goals.  The famous Kerala development model, which prioritised expenditure on 
social amenities, has led to Kerala performing comparatively well on various indices of human 
development (Frank and Chasin 1994, Ramchandran 1998). Accordingly, Kerala is widely 
considered as an example of a successful social democratic model within the Indian context 
(Heller 1999, Sandbrook et al. 2006). 
Kerala also exhibits a well-institutionalised party system. From its inception as a state 
in the 1950s party competition has been broadly structured along a Left-Right axis, with the 
coalitions led by the Communists generally to the left of the Congress. There has also been a 
high degree of party stability, and the political parties that contest elections have not changed 
very much since the 1960s. In 1957 when the first election took place in Kerala, the major 
players were the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Indian National Congress (INC), the 
Muslim League and the Socialists. Although the Socialists have since faded, most of the other 
major players remain the same.  
Unlike most other Indian states, there has been a remarkable level of party continuity. 
Even when new political parties have emerged, they have tended to be the result of splits 
within existing parties, rather than from the formation of genuinely new parties. For example 
in 1964 the CPI split into the CPI and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)); and in 
1965 the Kerala Congress was formed out of a split from the INC.1 By contrast, the BJP, which 
has emerged as a genuine new force in many states in India, had never won a seat in Kerala 
until the 2016 assembly elections (when it won a single seat).  Currently, the political 
competition in the state revolves around the Communist led Left Democratic Front (LDF) and 
the Congress led United Democratic Front (UDF).  
                                                          
1 Kerala Congress has since then faced numerous splits and mergers. Presently three Kerala Congress parties have representation in 
assembly. They are Kerala Congress (Mani), Kerala Congress (Jacob) and Kerala Congress (Balakrishna Pillai). 
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In this article we explore the sources of this political stability with reference to the 
structure of political alignments and social cleavage theory. In particular we show that 
historical legacies related to the initial development of the Communist party within the state 
continue to exert a strong influence on contemporary patterns of political competition. The 
reason for this, we suggest, relates to the development of party organisations and 
intermediary organisations which have persisted over time. 
Political alignments and social cleavages 
In the western context, social cleavages are often thought to stabilize party systems. Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) argued that cleavages were frozen at the time of the establishment of 
mass democracy in Europe, and have remained more or less constant ever since, at least until 
the 1960s which was when their research was carried out. They identified four main lines of 
cleavage – centre/periphery, church/state, land/industry and owner/worker. Subsequently 
Clark and Lipset (1991) have in essence argued that these old cleavage structures have been 
thawing, with a general decline in the role of social cleavages and the emergence of a more 
individualistic, less group-oriented basis to political behaviour. 
The idea of social cleavages has informed much research on party politics in India 
generally, and in Kerala specifically. Historically, scholars have studied the social base of 
political parties in Kerala from two perspectives: caste/community and class/occupation. 
With respect to caste/community the Communists have historically received strong support 
among the Dalits and the backward castes, such as Ezhavas (Gough 1968, Nossiter 1982). By 
contrast Congress has tended to receive strong support among religious minorities, 
particularly the Christians (Rao and Cohen 1974, Nossitter 1982).  This is in part due to the 
strong anti-communist stance that was taken by the church (Mathew 1989). Religious 
minorities have also tended to align with the Congresses coalition partners. The Kerala 
Congress also attracts support among Christians, particularly in the central Travancore region 
(Mathew 1989). Meanwhile the Muslim League draws most of its support from Muslims in 
the Malabar region located in the northern part of Kerala, particularly in the district 
Malappuram which was the theatre of the Moplah rebellion and is one of the few districts in 
India where Muslims are in a majority. 
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With respect to class and occupation, Communist support tends to be stronger in 
areas where there is a higher agricultural labourer to cultivator ratio (Zagoria 1971), whereas 
Congress tends to be stronger in areas where cultivators dominate (Murthy and Rao 1968). 
However, to a certain extent it should be noted that class and community are overlapping 
categories in Kerala. As Table 1 shows, during colonial times divisions in occupation, caste, 
and land ownership tended to reinforce each other. Many of these divisions still persist.  
Table 1: Social and Economic Position during Colonial times 
Occupation Land Caste 
Priests, rulers, administrative 
officials 
Jenmom (ownership right in 
land 
Brahmins, Rajas, aristocratic 
Nairs 
Militias in charge of law and 
order, petty officials 
Kanom (superior lease rights) Nairs and Nambudhiris 
Petty producers, traders, 
artisans, dry land labour 
Verumpattom (inferior lease 
rights) 
Christians, Muslims, non-
aristocratic Nairs and 
Ezhavas 
Wet land labour Agricultural labourer Ezhavas , Pulayas, 
Cherumans 
Source: Issac  and Tharakan (1986).  
Political alignments are often thought to derive from the policy stances of particular political 
parties (Evans and de Graaf 2013). In the initial decades of democratic governance in Kerala 
there were sharp policy differences between the Communists and Congress with respect to a 
number of issues like land reform and education, which carried both class and communal 
overtones. The communists advocated comprehensive land reform measures, which included 
the abolition of tenancy, redistribution of surplus land after setting a ceiling, and the provision 
of hutment dwelling for the landless agricultural labourers. Although they were successful at 
implementing some of these policies, the redistribution of surplus land was firmly resisted by 
the Congress (Herring 1983). With respect to education, Congress and Kerala Congress have 
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always taken a strong position against any sort of interference in privately run educational 
institutes. This is a policy which is very important for the Christian Churches in the state 
(Mathew 1989), and was the basis for a major mobilization against the Communist 
government in 1957 (Lieten 1977).  
However, since the 1980s the policy difference between the major parties has narrowed, and 
is not as polarised as previously (Yadav and Palshikar 2003). Once contentious issues have 
become institutionalised within the constitutional framework, and have been broadly 
accepted by both camps, even when the UDF came to power. Politics has thus become less 
about party’s distinctive view on position issues and has become more about issues of 
governance. The issue of land reform has become a less salient feature of political discourse 
since a series of policies were enacted which abolished landlordism by granting ownership of 
land to tenants, and hutment dwellings for agricultural labourers. Similarly, other class related 
issues which the Communists initially championed have become institutionalized in policy 
(Heller 1999). Since the tripartite arrangements between government, workers and 
employers were formed in factories and other work places in Kerala, which gave workers a 
say in wage bargaining, Trade Unions have also become less militant, and now focus more on 
employment generation through increased productivity. Even with respect to the increased 
privatisation of education, the Left has not attempted to try and change policy despite strong 
rhetoric against it. The salience of these class-related policy issues have therefore diminished 
as dividing lines between the main parties.  
A slightly different approach emphasises the geographical dimension of political alignments. 
According to Shin and Agnew (2002) electoral choices can only be understood in relation to 
the places in which political choices are exercised. This means, typically, local electoral 
districts or constituencies (Agnew, 1987). The strength of local party organizations, previous 
vote choices, and distribution of resources influence the ways in which electoral choices are 
made. Parties are not simply electoral vehicles, but should be seen as intermediaries between 
state and society, channelling resources from centre to periphery and rewarding some social 
and territorial interests at the expense of others. The capacity of parties to penetrate social 
groups, or to create parallel organizations, has been a key factor in reinforcing group identity 
and interest representation, so as to strengthen and perpetuate the cleavage structure. 
Indeed, working-class support for the left may be regarded as an historical consequence of 
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union penetration in leftist parties, thus creating a link between group identity and political 
support (see Mair 1998).  
According to Stein Rokkan (1977), segmentation is the ‘degree of interlocking between 
cleavage specific organizations active in the corporate channel and party organizations 
mobilizing for electoral support’. This idea of organized parties as vehicles for integrating and 
incorporating different social groups has a long history. Neumann argued that modern 
democracies could not survive unless democratic parties provided the kind of organizational 
integration offered by their non-democratic rivals and, in similar vein, Duverger (1964) 
regarded the emergence of mass parties as a positive step in democratic evolution, precisely 
because their locally articulated structures ensured a ‘closer and more faithful contact 
between the mass of the people and their ruling elites’. These local networks also served to 
foster political integration and channels of mobilization (Rokkan 1966). 
In one of the most comprehensive studies on the Communist movement in Kerala, 
Nossiter (1982) links support for the Communists in strongholds like Kasargode to the 
development of the party’s organisational machinery. Moreover, Oomen (1985) provides 
evidence of segmentation and shows how various agrarian organisations were linked to 
specific political parties: whereas rich and middle class farmers were affiliated with 
organisations related to Congress and Kerala Congress; small farmers and agricultural 
labourers were affiliated with organisations associated with Communist parties.  
This body of research suggests a number of hypotheses that might help to shed light 
on patterns of political stability in Kerala. According to social cleavage theory one reason why 
party politics in Kerala has been so stable is because different social groups are closely aligned 
to different parties. That is, different social groups provide the foundation for stability. 
However, another possibility is that political stability has a geographic as well as a social 
foundation. That is, in places where party organisations first developed, political support has 
persisted over time. It is this possibility that we investigate. 
 
Data and Methods 
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In order to examine these issues we use data from the 2011 Kerala Assembly Election Survey, 
carried out by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi. A total of 3133 
persons randomly selected from the latest electoral rolls were interviewed (after polling but 
before counting of votes) in 220 locations in 55 Assembly Constituencies spread across the 
state. The Assembly Constituencies and four polling booths within each sampled constituency 
were selected using Systematic Random Sampling. The interviews were conducted by 
specially trained field investigators. The respondents were interviewed face-to-face at their 
home, preferably alone. The voting question was asked using a dummy ballot paper and 
dummy ballot box. 
The social profile of the respondents interviewed largely matched the demographic 
profile of the state. The sample of respondents was 50% male and 50% female. With respect 
to different social groups, the sample consisted of 3% upper castes, 13% Nairs, 21% Ezhavas, 
12% Other OBCs, 8% Scheduled Caste, 2% Scheduled Tribes, 20% Muslims, and 18% 
Christians. 
Our dependent variable is reported vote choice in the 2011 Assembly elections. This 
has been classified into LDF voters, UDF voters, BJP voters and Others. Communists and some 
minor parties are part of the LDF, while Congress, Muslim league, Kerala Congress and some 
other minor parties constitute the UDF. Our main theoretical variables of interest are class, 
caste-community, and the historical legacy of the Communist party. For the general purposes 
of this paper we follow Kumar et al’s (2002) measure of class and have grouped occupations 
into four main groupings: first, the salariat (subdivided into high and low), largely consisting 
of salaried employees with relatively secure and permanent employment in business 
corporations and the civil service (although also including self-employed professionals); 
second, the bourgeoisie or business class (sub-divided into business and petty business), 
consisting of independents who are directly exposed to market forces and are not cushioned 
by the bureaucratic employment of the salariat; third, manual labourers (sub-divided into 
skilled/semi skilled and unskilled), with relatively high risks of unemployment and poor 
promotion prospects; fourth, agriculture (sub-divided into farmers with more than 5 acres of 
land and ‘small’ farmers and agricultural labourers).  To measure caste/community we 
distinguish between five main groups: the upper-castes (subdivided into Nairs), the OBC 
(subdivided into Ezhavas), the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the Muslims and the 
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Christians. To measure religion we distinguish between Hindus, Muslims, Christians and 
others.  
Lastly, to measure the historical strength of the Communist party we link constituency 
level data from 1957 to present day constituencies. Due to various delimitation exercises, the 
constituency boundaries in 2011 differ somewhat from 1957. In most cases these changes are 
relatively minor, and 29 out of the 55 constituencies are largely unchanged. For the remaining 
26 constituencies we use disaggregated units of geography to provide the closest match (see 
Appendix). Because there is likely to be some measurement error we distinguish between 
four different levels of support, ranging from those places where the Communists did not 
have much of a presence in 1957 (where they received less than 30% of the vote) to those 
places where they had a strong presence in 1957 (where they received more than 50% of the 
vote).  
Results 
What factors, then, are associated with party support in Kerala? To what extent is vote choice 
structured by social cleavages to do with class, caste and religion, and to what extent is it 
structured by historical factors to do with the emergence of the Communist party at the 
inception of democracy? To answer these questions we first examine the bivariate 
associations between each of these variables and vote choice, and then specify a multivariate 
logistic regression to explore the joint impact of social cleavages and historical legacies on 
contemporary patterns of political support. 
Table 1: Occupational and vote choice 2011(row percentages) 
Occupational 
Category 
                          Major Fronts Total 
 LDF UDF BJP  Others 
High salaried 40 54 5 1 232 
Low salaried 48 45 7 1 209 
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Business 37 56 6 2 271 
Petty 
business 
59 39 0 3 75 
Skilled and 
semi-skilled 
workers 
54 39 6 2 578 
Unskilled 
workers 
57 40 4 0 550 
Farmers 35 60 5 0 65 
Lower 
agricultural 
occupation 
44 52 4 0 353 
Others  47 47 5 1 336 
N=2669 
Table 2 shows the association between occupational class and vote choice. There is some 
evidence of a class divide: the Communists perform well among those involved in less secure 
occupations, such as the unskilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled workers, and the petty 
business class. By contrast the Congress (with UDF allies) perform well among those in more 
secure occupations, such as the high salaried, business and farmers. The difference in support 
for the Communists between the high salaried and the unskilled workers is about 17 
percentage points. Although this represents a clear class divide, it is not as pronounced as the 
class divide in other countries, such as the UK, where the difference between these two 
groups was closer to 40 percentage points during the heyday of class politics in the 1960s 
(Heath 2015). 
Table 2: Caste/Community and vote choice, 2011 (row percentages) 
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Caste/ 
Community 
                                               Major Fronts Total 
 LDF UDF BJP  Others 
Upper Caste 40 38 21 1 82 
Nair 46 44 10 0 336 
Ezhava 68 26 5 1 580 
Other OBC 55 40 4 1 339 
Scheduled 
Castes 
66 29 5 0 228 
Scheduled 
Tribes 
49 41 6 4 53 
Non-
Backward 
Muslims 
46 53 0 1 90 
Backward 
Muslims 
35 62 2 2 449 
Non-
backward 
Christians 
21 76 1 1 305 
Backward 
Christians 
45 54 0 1 157 
Others 44 46 10 0 50 
N=2669 
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Table 4 shows the association between caste/community and vote choice. The communists 
do much better among the Scheduled Castes and Ezhavas than among the Upper castes. The 
difference in support for the Communists between the SC and the Upper castes is 16 
percentage points. By contrast support for the Congress (and allies) does not vary much by 
caste, but tends to be much higher among the Christians and the Muslims than it is among 
the Hindus (see Table 6). The difference in support for the UDF between Hindus and Christians 
is 36 percentage points (this holds even when the alliance partners are discounted).  
Table 3: Religion and vote choice, 2011 (row percentages) 
Religion                                          Major Fronts Total 
 LDF UDF BJP Others  
Hindu 60 32 7 1 1570 
Muslim 34 64 1 1 560 
Christian 30 68 0 1 494 
Others 56 27 13 4 45 
N=2669 
There is thus a clear religious divide between the two main parties, that dwarves the effect 
of either class or caste. Differences in voting behaviour between religious groups are much 
greater than the internal differences within religious groups. Given the absence of communal 
tensions in the state, the salience of this divide is perhaps somewhat unexpected. Indeed, 
Kerala is often noted as a state where there are particularly good communal relations 
between religious communities. 
Table 4: Historical legacy of Communist strength in 1957 and vote choice, 2011 (row 
percentages) 
Communist 
history 
                                         Major Fronts Total 
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 LDF UDF BJP Others  
Very weak 42 53 4 1 620 
Weak 48 43 8 1 510 
Strong 47 47 5 1 837 
Very strong 59 38 3 1 702 
N=2669 
Table 4 shows the association between the historical strength of the Communist party in 1957 
and contemporary patterns of political support. People who live in areas where the 
communists did not have much of a presence in 1957 are substantially less likely to support 
the LDF than people who lived in former communist strongholds. The difference in support 
for the communists between people living in these different types of place is 17 percentage 
points. This difference is not as great as the divide we observed along religious lines, though 
is comparable to the divide we observed along caste and class lines. This indicates that the 
patterns of political conflict at the inception of democracy in Kerala are still – to a certain 
extent – reflected in contemporary patterns of party competition. 
Multivariate analysis 
To what extent are contemporary patterns of political competition still shaped by historical 
legacies relating to the formation of parties in the state? Do these historical legacies still shape 
the geography of political support in Kerala – or are they themselves partly a reflection of the 
social divides within the state? Previous research on the social context of political 
participation has suggested that differences between places can be accounted for in two main 
ways. They may be the result of compositional factors, such as the different social and 
demographic make-up of the different areas or the result of contextual factors, relating to the 
structure of the social or political environment (Huckefeldt 1979). That is, people living in 
some areas may be more likely to vote Communist because of the social composition of those 
areas (such as the high concentration of OBCs and SC) or they may be more likely to vote 
Communist because of the organisational networks established in those areas at the 
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inception of democracy. The only way to distinguish between these two possibilities is to carry 
out multiple regression which simultaneously controls for both individual and contextual level 
factors. 
To answer these questions we specify a multivariate logistic regression which controls for 
individual level factors such as caste, religion, and class, and historical factors to do with the 
geographical distribution of votes from 1957. Are people still more likely to vote for the LDF 
in places where the communists first established themselves as a major force in 1957; and if 
so, does this legacy reinforce or cut across existing social cleavages?  
The full model that we specify is as follows:  
Logit (vote choice) = β0 + β1 * (Age) + β2 * (Sex) + β3 * (Occupation) + β4 * (Caste-
community) + β5 * (Communist stronghold) +  Ɛ   
Table 5 displays the results of two models: the first model contains socio-demographic factors 
and the second model also contains the variable on historical communist strong hold. From 
Model 1 we can see that support for the LDF is significantly higher among OBCs and SCs than 
it is among Muslims and Christians; and is significantly higher among skilled and unskilled 
workers than it is among the salaried professionals. However, the other individual level 
variables to do with age and gender are not significant.  
Turning to Model 2 we can see that the communist stronghold term is positive 
(b=0.48) and highly significant. People who live in areas where the Communists first 
established themselves as an electoral force in 1957 are significantly more likely to still vote 
for the LDF over 50 years later. This indicates a remarkable degree of electoral continuity. 
Moreover, we can see that when we control for historical factors to do with the emergence 
of the Communist party the magnitude and significance of the individual level factors to do 
with class and caste do not change. This indicates that the geographical cleavage cuts across 
the social cleavages rather than reinforcing them.  
Table 5 Logistic regression of vote choice, 2011 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B s.e. B s.e. 
Age 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
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Male 0.015 0.851 0.016 0.856 
Caste     
  Upper (REF)     
  OBC 0.599*** 0.130 0.623*** 0.131 
  SC 0.764*** 0.187 0.795*** 0.188 
  Muslim -0.630*** 0.142 -0.562*** 0.144 
  Christian -0.905*** 0.148 -0.863*** 0.149 
  Other -0.048 0.238 -0.033 0.240 
Occupation     
High salaried (REF)     
Low salaried 0.301 0.209 0.324 0.210 
Business -0.043 0.198 0.017 0.199 
Petty business 0.716* 0.289 0.734* 0.290 
Skilled & semi-skilled  0.548*** 0.172 0.568*** 0.173 
Unskilled workers 0.516** 0.173 0.512** 0.174 
Farmers -0.058 0.311 -0.078 0.312 
Lower agricultural  0.134 0.184 0.135 0.186 
Others 0.252 0.187 0.233 0.188 
Communist history     
  Very weak     
  Weak   0.133 0.134 
  Strong   0.069 0.120 
  Very Strong   0.484*** 0.123 
Constant -0.267 0.209 -0.462* 0.223 
Notes:  * denotes p=<0.05; ** denotes p<0.01; *** denotes p<0.001 
We can get a better idea of the relative strength of these different cleavages by calculating 
the predicted probabilities of voting for the LDF for different social groups and people living 
in different parts of the state, controlling for all of the other variables in the model. As 
previously mentioned, some of these cleavages overlap, and so this strategy allows us to 
examine the independent impact of each factor. For example, the probability of an SC voting 
for the LDF is 70 percent, whereas the probability of a Christian of the same age, gender, and 
class, living in the same part of the state voting for the LDF is just 31 percent. This represents 
a difference of nearly 40 percentage points. Turning to class, the probability of a semi-skilled 
worker voting for the LDF is 58%, whereas the probability of a high salaried worker doing so 
is just 45%, everything else being equal. This represents a difference of just over 10 
percentage points. Lastly, the probability of voting for the LDF is 59 percent for someone who 
lives in an area where the Communists were very strong in 1957, compared to just 48 percent 
for someone who lives in an area where they did not have much of a presence, everything 
else being equal. This also represents a difference of just over 10 percentage points. 
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These findings indicate that parties in Kerala are closely tied to social cleavages, and the caste-
community cleavage in particular is very strong. As Heath (2005) shows, the strength of social 
cleavages in India are strongly related to electoral volatility, and so this is perhaps one reason 
why the party system in Kerala has been so stable over time. However, these findings also 
indicate that there is a clear geographic structure to contemporary patterns of voting 
behaviour that is shaped by the historical legacy of the communist party. This divide is similar 
in magnitude to the class divide.  
Conclusion 
Social cleavage theory has been applied to many developing democracies around the world; 
yet in most cases it has little explanatory power. In particular, there is little evidence to 
support the idea that party systems are frozen at the time of the inception of democracy. 
Most party systems in developing democracies are highly unstable, with an emphasis on 
change rather than stability. However, Kerala presents a rare exception to these cases.  Not 
only is electoral competition in Kerala relatively stable, but this stability has a clear social 
structure and also a clear geographical structure, which can be traced back to the 
development of the Communist party more than 50 years ago. In those places where the 
Communists first established a stronghold; people still continue to support the party, 
irrespective of class and caste identities.  
There are various possible explanations for this finding. But one explanation we can rule out. 
Given that the communists have tended to be more popular among some groups in society 
than others, we might expect that where these groups are numerous the Communists will do 
better. Thus one reason why they did so well in some places in 1957 is perhaps because these 
were the areas where their natural support base resided. However, when we control for both 
historical legacy and demographic variables we see that history continues to matter. This 
suggests that we cannot reduce the impact of historical legacy to favourable demographic 
factors. So what then accounts for the enduring legacy of 1957? We suggest that part of the 
story relates to the development of party organisations and intermediary organisations which 
have persisted over time. One avenue for future research is to explore the structure of these 
overlapping cleavages in other states, and to examine the extent to which variations in the 
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strength of historical legacies and social cleavages are linked to stability and volatility in 
general.  
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